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Beckoning to his younger cousin Franklin, Theodore Roosevelt ad-
vised, "You don't gain anything by single isolated actions. You have
to have a coherent plan for dealing with Japan, China, the whole Pa-
cific - especially when Asia is changing so."' Over half a century later,
another United States President recently expressed the very same sen-
timents as he cast his gaze towards Asia. Unlike Theodore Roosevelt,
however, this President was not directing his discussion to a fellow
American. Rather, in November 1993, President Clinton addressed
his statements to the world at large as he stood in unison with a string
of leaders from throughout the Asia Pacific. Having convened an un-
precedented meeting of the economic leaders of the Asia Pacific Eco-
nomic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the leaders shared their "Vision"
for the future at the Seattle Summit:
In this post Cold War era, we have an opportunity to build a new eco-
nomic foundation for the Asia Pacific that harnesses the energy of our
diverse economies, strengthens cooperation, and promotes prosper-
ity .... As members of APEC, we are committed to deepening our spirit
* Law Student, Northwestern University School of Law. Candidate for J.D., 1996.
1 FRANK GiBINY, Tim PACIFIC CENTuRY 534 (1992).
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of community based on our shared vision of achieving stability, security,
and prosperity for our peoples.2
APEC is composed of eighteen member nations from the Asia
Pacific, a region which encompasses the most dynamic economies in
the world. Its members include Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile,
China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zea-
land, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea,
Taiwan, Thailand, and the United States.3 Indeed, the forum is distin-
guished for being the only significant international organization to
which China and Taiwan both belong.4
The APEC member embody a region of the world economy
which achieved extraordinary growth rates during the 1980s.5 Most
notably the East Asian region accounted for the highest growth rates
during the period.6 In the Pacific, the United States OIC had em-
barked upon its longest period of economic expansion beginning in
1982.7 Since exports and international investment constituted the pri-
mary sectors of growth in the members' economies, the Asia Pacific
2 APEC Economic Leaders' Vsion Statemen4 4 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 833 (1993).
3 Malaysia Dismisses APEC Accord as "Non-Binding, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov.15,
1994, at "1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File. Other foreign nations that have
expressed interest in joining APEC including Russia, Vietnam, Cambodia, and some Latin
American countries. Such countries will have to await admission pending the end of the three
year moratorium on new members. David Crane, Bold Plan Would Push Pacific Trade, THE
ToRoNTo STAR, Sept. 4, 1994, at *2, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File. *hereinaf-
ter all electronic database cites paginated per sceen
4 Franklin L. Lavin, Big Thunder, Little Rain: NAFTA Isn't the Only Game in Town; But
Can the Clintonites Do Any Better With the Pacific Rim?, NAT'L REv., Nov. 29, 1993, at 48.
APEC members are officially called "economies," a term which thereby allowed the member-
ship of China and Taiwan (neither recognizes the other officially) and the British colony Hong
Kong, whose sovereignty will soon revert back to China in 1997. Pacific Rim Leaders Hold First
APEC Summit Economic Ytes Discussed in Seattlde FACTS ON FLE WoRLD NEWS DIG., Nov. 25,
1993, at *1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
5 THE U.S.-JAPAN ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP rN EAST AND SoUTHEAsT AsIA 4 (Kaoru
Okuizumi, Kent E. Calder, and Gerrit W. Gong eds. 1992). Whereas the East Asian economies
represented four percent of the world's GNP in 1960, by 1991 they constituted 25 percent of the
world's GNP (a GNP comparable to that of the United States). Robert A. Manning & Paula
Stem, The Myth of the Pacific Community, FoREIGN AFFAms, Nov.-Dec. 1994, at *2, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. The East Asian economies currently hold 41 percent of
global bank reserves, an increase of 17 percent from 1980. Id.
6 Such dramatic growth was experienced namely in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong
Kong, the ASEAN member countries (Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Thai-
land, and Brunei), and China. Tim U.S.-JAPAN ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP IN EAST AND SOUTH-
EAsT AsiA, supra note 5.
7 The East Asian economies are estimated to account for one third of global GNP by the
year 2000. Furthermore, the World Bank has projected that Asia will be responsible for half of
the global GNP growth and half of the global trade growth in the decade from 1990 to 2000.
Manning & Stem, supra note 5.
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economies became increasingly interdependent. Today the world's
largest trading region, the Asia Pacific comprises 41% of world trade,
and 53% of world gross national product (GNP).8 Indeed, U.S. trade
in the Asia-Pacific far exceeds U.S. trade with Europe or Latin
America: trans-Pacific trade is more than two times the percentage of
trans-Atlantic trade and three times the percentage of than inter-
American trade.9 Not only is the Asia-Pacific market the largest mar-
ket for United States exports, representing approximately two billion
consumers and nearly $130 billion in United States goods sold, but
also more than two million U.S. jobs are created due to trade in the
region.10 The region is viewed as being essential to America's interna-
tional economic vitality.
The members of APEC aim to achieve the goal of "open region-
alism." Under this guiding principle they have agreed to adopt the
long-term goal of free and open trade and investment in the Asia-
Pacific by the year 2020.11 In accordance with this goal, the nations'
objective is to identify and remove obstacles to trade and investment
among member countries in line with the multilateral framework of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).2 In the 1994
Bogor Declaration, the members specifically rejected the idea of "an
inward looking trading bloc that would divert from the pursuit of
global free trade.' 1 3 Should the members realize the aim of "open
regionalism" by the 2020 deadline, trade barriers for countries within
APEC will be removed and non-APEC and APEC members alike will
be free to trade in the region.' 4
8 APEC Leaders Reach Agreement on Creation of Free Trade Zone, DAILY REPORTS FOR
ExEcuTnvEs, 1994 DER 219 d3 (Nov. 16, 1994).
9 Lavin, supra note 4, at 50. From 1978 to 1991, U.S. trans-pacific trade experienced a dra-
matic increase from $80 billion to $361 billion. Manning & Stem, supra note 5, at *3.
10 Christopher Cites China Rights Record on Eve of Major Asia.Pacific Conference, BNA
INT'L TRADE DAILY, Nov. 18, 1993, at * 2, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File. An
United States official has described the extraordinary "U.S. export trade opportunities in the
infrastructure markets in Asia, such as telecommunications, computers, and medical equipment,
where the U.S. remains the world leader." U.S. To Proceed Slowly With APEC Identification,
THE XlNHUA GENERAL OvERsEAs NEws SERVICE, Nov. 2, 1993, at *2, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Cumws File.
11 APEC Leaders Reach Agreement on Creation of Free Trade Zone, supra note 8.
12 APEC Leaders Reach Agreement on Creation of Free Trade Zone, supra note 8.
13 Free Trade With an Asian Flair: The Key Word Is "Non-binding, Tim CmUsmuN SCIENCE
MoNrroR, Nov. 16, 1994, at *2, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
14 Is the 2020 Vision a Mirage?, Soutm CINA MOmNN Post, Nov. 6, 1994, at 5. For fur-
ther information on the argument that the resolution of four political questions will prove deci-
sive in shaping the eventual economic outlook for the Asia Pacific region, see Nicholas
Eberstadt, Pacific Rim Challenges Are More Political than Economic, WASHL TIMES, Nov. 17,
1993, at A19.
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As impressive as the aggregate economic weight of APEC mem-
bers may be, the members' diversity is more striking than their simi-
larities. The members differ in ethnic background, language, religion,
stage of economic development, and political system. 5 Within Asia
itself, APEC includes China, with 1.2 billion citizens and a per capita
annual income of United States $370, and Singapore with 2.8 million
citizens and an average annual income of $27,000.16 Such differences
have played a large role in the members' conflict regarding APEC's
identity. Though the members support the ultimate goal of promoting
an open trading system, the members differ in the means of achieving
such a goal. While the group was started in 1989 as a forum for discus-
sion, members have been divided in deciding whether to keep APEC
as a purely consultative forum or to transform it into a rule-making
body.17
This Comment will demonstrate that although the APEC mem-
ber nations are divided between two contrasting approaches to the
future development of APEC, the "Western" and "Asian" approaches
respectively, they nonetheless share a dynamic Asia-Pacific economy
which offers the incentive for economic cooperation in the area.
Although such dynamic economic growth has been led primarily by
the acts of the private sector, such economic performance would not
have been possible without the facilitating role of the APEC govern-
ments.'8 In accordance with the goal to achieve "open regionalism"
by the year 2020, this Comment proposes that the APEC members
adopt the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law's
(UNCITRAL) Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration
in order to facilitate trade and investment in the Asia Pacific region.
There are two major reasons to adopt UNCITRAL's Model Law.
First, as the GATr's dispute settlement mechanisms pertain solely to
disputes between governments, APEC needs to address the realm of
private international commercial disputes in order to facilitate and in-
15 The APEC Family, MAnucma DAILY NEWS, Nov. 13, 1994, at *1, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curmws File.
16 Duncan Hughes, Support Strong for Regional Free Trade Proposa SouTH CHINA MoR,-
NrO Post, Sept. 1, 1994, at 12.
17 U.S. To Proceed Slowly With APEC Identification, supra note 10. The nations have pur-
posefully refrained from having the name "Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation" end with "com-
munity," "organization," or "association" and such an ommission reflects the reluctance of many
members to turn APEC into an institution with formal decision-making power. Andrew Pollack,
Asian Nations Wary on Free Trad4 NEw YoRK Thmns, Nov. 11, 1994, at *3, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File.
18 Report of the Pacific Business Forum, A Business Blueprint for APEC, Asia Pacific Eco-
nomic Cooperation Secretariat, at 1 (Oct. 1994).
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crease trade and investment in the region. Second, as APEC's agenda
has become increasingly ambitious, it is lacking in specific commit-
ments; the forum is in jeopardy of losing credibility by failing to pro-
duce practical results. In adopting the Model law, each nation could
be taking a practical and substantive step towards the facilitation of
business transactions in the region, thereby helping APEC to achieve
the ultimate goal of "open regionalism" by the year 2020.
Part H of this Comment will explain the factors leading to
APEC's formation as well as APEC's organization, process, and activ-
ities. Part III will then present the current division within APEC re-
garding APEC's future development. Part IV will introduce the
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,
presenting the argument that by taking pragmatic, cooperative steps
in the path towards free trade, APEC can further bridge the divide
between the Asian and Western approach. Part IV will explain that
by adopting the Model Law and thereby inaugurating market-induced
movement toward free trade, such private sector activity will provide
the incentive for members to further cooperate and integrate their
economies. Part V will examine the drawbacks and benefits of adopt-
ing the Model framework.
II. WHAT EXACTLY Is APEC, How DID IT COME ABOUT, AND
WHAT DOES IT Do?
A. Factors Leading to APEC's Formation
In January 1989, the former Australian Prime Minister Robert
Hawke proposed the creation of a framework to foster economic co-
operation in 'the Asia Pacific.19 At its inception, APEC comprised
twelve nations which gathered to create an informal entity known as
the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum.20 In view of the in-
creasing interdependence of the region, the twelve ministers acknowl-
edged the need for a consultative forum to promote the multilateral
free trading system, to enhance opportunities for regional trade and
investment, and to discuss common economic interests.2 '
19 Recent Trends in APEC, APEC Office, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, at 1
(Mar. 1994).
20 The initial twelve nations were Australia, Brunei, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia,
New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, and the United States. RICH-
ARD L. GRANT ET AL, AsIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION: THE CHALLENGE AnEAD 1
(1990).
21 Id. Since its creation in 1989, APEC has expanded its membership to include China, Hong
Kong, and Chinese Taipei in 1991, Mexico and Papua New Guinea in 1993, and Chile was invited
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Three factors explain APEC's sudden coalescence. First, with the
advent of the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement and the
expectation of the 1992 Single European Market, Asian nations began
to fear that global markets would be reduced to discriminatory trading
blocs, thereby undermining their strategies of export-led growth.2
The Asian nations looked to APEC as a vehicle to promote open
trade. Second, recognizing the dynamic growth in the region, the
United States was strongly interested in APEC membership, lest it be
excluded from a potentially powerful new economic bloc.3 Third, due
to geographic proximity, a shared desire for trade liberalization,24 and
highly interdependent economies, consultation and cooperation
among the nations of the Pacific Rim made practical sense.
B. APEC's Organization and Process
APEC is presently a cooperative body that operates by consen-
sus. The forum is founded upon what is known as the "four Cs: coop-
eration, consensus, a collegial atmosphere, and consultation."'
Unlike the European Union (formerly the European Economic Com-
munity) whose legal foundation rests upon the Rome Treaty of 1958,
APEC has no legal foundation because the members have refrained
from signing an international treaty or other constitutive document.26
APEC is devoid of any enforcement mechanisms and its decisions are
non-binding. Reaching agreement by consensus, each member has
one vote; consequently, every APEC member has one veto as well.27
Some members have been reluctant to cede more decision-making
power to APEC for fear that the United States would attempt to dom-
inate the group and turn it into an organization to implement its own
foreign policy priorities.8
to join in late 1994. Fact Sheet" Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 4 DEr'T ST. Dis-
PATC H 835 (1993).
22 Kenneth W. Abbott & Gregory W. Bowman, Economic Integration for the Asian Century:
An Early Look at New Approaches, 4 TRANSNAT'L LAW & CoiN-Mn. PROBS. 187, 209 (1994).
23 Id. at 209-10.
24 Lavin, supra note 4, at 48.
25 Nusara Thaitawat & Vichit Sirithaveepom, Core Differences Emerge as APEC Meet Kicks
Off, BANGKOx Posr, March 20, 1994, at *3, available in LEXIS, World Library, Cumws File.
26 William Yang, USA: Upcoming APEC Has Added Global Significance Bus. TAiWAN,
Nov. 15, 1993, at *4, available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File.
27 Lavin, supra note 4, at 51.
28 See Thaitawat and Sirithaveepom, supra note 25, at *1. For further information regarding
actions of the Clinton Administration that have contributed to Asian ambivalence, see Manning
& Stem, infra note 47.
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Though APEC began as a purely informal dialogue group, APEC
is gradually beginning to assume a more defined structure. For in-
stance, in 1992, APEC members established a permanent APEC Sec-
retariat based in Singapore. The Secretariat operates with a budget of
two million dollars.2 9 Further defining APEC's structure are the an-
nual APEC Economic Leader's meetings, proposed by President Clin-
ton in 199330 which provide individual leaders with an informal forum
for the exchange of views on a wide variety of economic issues. The
first such meeting was the Seattle Summit in November 1993, and the
most recent Leaders' Meeting was the Jakarta Summit in November
1994. Adding to APEC's structure are annual Ministerial Meetings,
which provide a decision-making forum for the implementation of
various APEC activities and the discussion of APEC's future develop-
ment and direction.31 Senior Officials Meetings are held four to five
times annually in order to prepare for the yearly APEC Summits.32
Another branch of APEC's structure is the Budget and Administra-
tion Committee, which was established in 1993 to advise APEC senior
officials on budgetary, administrative, and managerial issues.33 Again
in 1993, upon the U.S. initiative, APEC adopted a Trade and Invest-
ment Framework which formed the Committee on Trade and Invest-
ment (CTI). The Committee undertakes initiatives to improve the
flow of goods, services, and technology in the region, in keeping with
the principles of the GATT.34 Closely linked with CTI is the Ad Hoe
Group on Economic Trends and Issues (ETI), which provides a forum
to exchange information on the present state and future prospect for
greater economic interdependence within the region, along with other
regional economic trends and issues, to provide a broader context for
cooperation in APEC.35 Further refining APEC's structure are the
APEC working groups which promote cooperation in areas such as
trade and investment data, trade promotion, investment technology
and transfer, human resource development, regional energy coopera-
tion, marine-resource conservation, telecommunications, transporta-
29 APEC Ministerial Meeting Joint Statement, 4 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 831 (1993).
30 Anna Taing, U.S. In Move To Create More Defined APEC Structure, Bus. TIMEnS (MALAY-
sIA), Sept. 30, 1993, at *1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
31 Recent Trends in APEC, supra note 19, at 2.
32 Recent Trends in APEC, supra note 19, at 2.
33 Recent Trends in APEC, supra note 19, at 2.
34 Declaration on an APEC Trade and Investment Framework 4 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 832
(1993).
35 Recent Trends in APEC, supra note 19, at 3.
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tion, tourism, and fisheries.36 An integral component of the APEC
forum is the non-governmental Eminent Persons Group, set up in
1992 and comprised of academics, economists, and professionals,
which assesses the current economic outlook for the APEC region
and additionally develops "vision" reports regarding the future pros-
pects of APEC as it moves into the 21st century.3 7 Finally, in estab-
lishing the Pacific Business Forum and the Small and Medium
Enterprises Ministerial Meetings, APEC has aimed to increase private
business sector involvement. Indeed, such an exhaustive description
attests to APEC's progressive institutional development.
C. APEC's Activities: The Seattle and Jakarta Summits
APEC's recent history has been marked by two historic summit
meetings: the 1993 Seattle Summit hosted by the United States and
the 1994 Jakarta Summit hosted by Indonesia. The unprecedented
APEC Seattle Summit constituted the largest gathering of Asian and
Pacific leaders since President Lyndon Johnson convened a Summit in
the Philippines in 1966 to discuss the escalating crisis in Vietnam.3 8
President Clinton described the Summit as a resounding success, cit-
ing APEC members' ability to forge a stronger regional identity and
purpose to promote a regional economy "characterized by openness,
cooperation, dynamic growth, expanded trade, improved transporta-
36 Fact SheeL" APEC Working Groups, 4 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 837-840 (1993). Among the
various Working Groups' accomplishments, the Trade and Investment Data Working Group has
compiled statistics on members' merchandise trade, services trade, and foreign investment, with
the purpose to identify differences in members' trade practices. Id. at 838. Additionally, in a
meeting in May of 1993, the Investment and Industrial Science and Technology Working Group
explored the possibility of creating an electronic network for information on investment and
technology transfer with the larger purpose to incorporate this information into a single APEC
information network. Id. at 840.
37 Recent Trends in APEC, supra note 19, at 4.
38 Thomas L Friedman, The Pacific Summit. Leaders at Summit Seek Strong Pacific Commu-
nity, NEw YomR Tnias, Nov. 21, 1993, at Al. The united front of Asia Pacific nations at the
Seattle Summit stood in stark contrast to the events of almost 40 years ago, when the Indonesian
President Sukarno hosted a conference of Third World Leaders in Indonesia. Paul Blustein, Pact
a Milestone in March of Capitalism; Indonesia's Suharto, in Political Shift Led Forum to Open
Trade WAsH. PosT, Nov. 16, 1994, at Al. Calling for a new economic order, the attending
countries spoke of "economic confrontation with the industrialized powers," invoking the words
"anti-imperialism" and "anti-colonialism." Id. at Al. During the 1970s, the same Third World
countries demanded compensation from the West in the form of debt relief for its exploitation of
the poor and they rejected their status as host nations of multinational corporations. Id. In
contrast, at both the Seattle and Jakarta Summits the notion of Third World / First World con-
frontation was completely anachronistic as the Asia Pacific nations instead chose to discuss in-
creased foreign investment, in particular an APEC investment code which would facilitate
foreign companies' investing in member countries.
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tion and communications and high-skilled, high-paying jobs. '39 While
at the Summit, the APEC Leaders pronounced their "Vision State-
ment," reaffirming their commitment to economic cooperation
through APEC and pledging their support for a system of "open re-
gionalism" under which the Asia Pacific would become a free trade
region, open to trade from APEC members and third parties alike.4 °
Among the specific initiatives undertaken at the Summit, APEC
members agreed to an extensive package of additional trade liberali-
zation offers in order to promote a successful conclusion of the Uru-
guay Round,41 they agreed to hold annual APEC summits, and the
leaders resolved to develop an investment code for adoption at the
1994 Summit.42 The code would be nonbinding, designed to protect
and promote private investment in the region.
Notably, the members at the Seattle Summit did not agree to take
steps to establish an institutionalized, formal trading organization.
While some members such as the U.S. and Australia advocated that
members strive to create an Asia-Pacific free trade area, other mem-
bers such as Thailand and Japan preferred the existing informal, con-
sensual approach and were opposed to setting up centralized,
bureaucratic structures to govern APEC.43 Indeed, reflecting an un-
dercurrent of tension among some of the APEC members, the Malay-
sian Prime Minister Mahatir Mohamed boycotted the Summit, citing
his opposition to the Summit being a Washington initiative rather than
a consensual APEC initiative.44 The Malaysian Prime Minister also
asserted the desirability of an East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC)
which would include Asians only, to the exclusion of the United
39 David Vienneau, Pacific Rim Nations Eye Trade Pact, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 21, 1993, at
A3.
40 Abbott, supra note 22, at 209.
41 Indeed, the 1993 Seattle Summit was initiated in part by a shared desire to facilitate the
then-stalled Uruguay Round negotiations. Many of the APEC members thought that by uniting
in Seattle and "hinting that the grouping could become an alternative to the GATI if the Uru-
guay Round failed, they prodded the EU into making the concessions needed to conclude the
world trade talks." Guy de Jonquieres,'Different Aims, Common Cause: Complex Pressures Led
18 Asian-Pacific Countries to Form APEC Trading Bloc, FIN. TinMS, Nov. 18,1994, at 16. In the
end, the additional liberalization offers agreed upon at the Summit made a decisive contribution
to the subsequent sucess of the Uruguay Round.
42 C. Fred Bergsten, APEC and World Trade: A Force for Worldwide Liberalization, FOR-
EiGN AFF., May-June 1994, at *2-3, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
43 Pacific Rim Leaders Hold First APEC Summit Economic Ties Discussed in Seattle, supra
note 4, at *2.
44 Officials Put Final Touches to APEC Declaration, AGrENCE FRANCE PRmsE, Nov. 16,
1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
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States, Australia, and New Zealand.45 The Prime Minister reasoned
that since the United States partakes in both APEC and NAFTA,
there would not be any threat with Asian nations participating in both
APEC and the EAEC.46 Malaysia has not been the only member to
express discontent. At the same time, other Asian officials were said
to be wary of possible attempts by the United States to assert domina-
tion over the region through APEC and to impose its foreign policy
initiatives. 47 Thus, while the Summit presented a step in the direction
toward freer trade, the undercurrent of tension could not be ignored.
In November 1994, exactly one year after the Seattle Summit, the
collection of Pacific Rim nations met yet again for a second annual
APEC Summit in Jakarta, Indonesia. In announcing what they called
a "historic" political agreement, the 1994 Bogor Declaration, the
APEC leaders agreed to adopt the long-term goal of free and open
trade and investments in the Asia-Pacific by the year 2020.4 The goal
was to be pursued by further reducing barriers to trade and invest-
ment and by promoting the free flow of goods, services, and capital in
a manner consistent with the GAIT, so as to encourage liberalization
in the world as a whole.49 Importantly, the pace of liberalization was
to take into account the diversity of APEC member economies, "with
the industrialized economies achieving the goal of free and open trade
and investment no later than the year 2010 and developing economies
no later than the year 2020." 05 Explicitly included in the Bogor Dec-
laration was an outright rejection of "the creation of an inward-look-
ing trading bloc that would divert the members from the pursuit of
global free trade. ''51
While the trade accord was extraordinarily ambitious, it is not
expected to contain any commitments for immediate actions, it is non-
binding, and is fairly vague as well. For instance, the agreement ne-
45 Asia Pacific Leaders Make Commitments to Freer Trade, GATT, Another Meeting, BNA
INT'L TRADE DAILY, Nov. 23, 1993, at *3, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
46 Thaitawat and Sirithaveepom, supra note 25, at *4.
47 Some APEC nations claim that the actions of the Clinton Administration, particularly
during the first 15 months in office, contributed to Asian ambivalence about the United States.
They cite the United State's generally differing approach to human rights, labor rights, and the
environment, and point specifically to the "economic and political disputes with China (over
most-favored-nation trade status, human rights), with Japan (trade), North Korea (nuclear
proliferation), Singapore (the caning of a U.S. citizen), Indonesia (labor rights, trade, and human
rights violations), Thailand (drug trafficking).. ." Manning & Stem, supra note 5, at *5.
48 APEC Leaders Reach Agreement on Creation of Free Trade Zone; supra note 8.
49 APEC Leaders Reach Agreement on Creation of Free Trade Zone, supra note 8.
50 APEC Leaders Reach Agreement on Creation of Free Trade Zone, supra note 8.
51 Cameron Barr, Free Trade with an Asia Flair: The Key Word is 'Nonbinding, TmE Cmus-
AN Sci. MoNIuoR, Nov. 16, 1994, at *2, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
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glected to deal specifically with the contentious issue regarding which
countries qualify as "developing" nations. This categorization is cru-
cial to the implementation of the timetable because developing na-
tions are able to benefit from the later 2020 deadline.52
Indeed, amidst all the clamor for free trade, the Jakarta Summit
was not problem-free. While Malaysia, China, Japan, and South Ko-
rea were resistant to setting a target date of 2020, the United States
strongly backed the 2020 date for developing nations while wary of
accepting the 2010 date for developed countries.53 Citing the risk that
economic disputes pose for the spirit of cooperation, the nations
agreed to examine the possibility of a voluntary consultative dispute
mediation service to assist members in resolving their trade and other
economic disputes.5 4 While many APEC members felt a "sense of re-
strained euphoria," some view the Bogor Declaration as "an agree-
ment to agree" that leaves many of the crucial details to be hammered
out at the 1995 APEC summit in Osaka, Japan.55
Ill. TE DIVISION WrrIIN APEC OVER APEC's FUTuRuE
DEVELOPMENT
A. The Western and Asian Approaches
As a writer once described, "Stretching from rich Japan to poor
China to rural New Zealand and across to the west coast of America,
the Asia-Pacific is a disparate region divided by history, religion, lan-
guage, culture, government, and levels of wealth and development. 56
In terms of level of economic development, APEC includes advanced
industrial economies, newly industrialized economies, and developing
economies. While developed economies must confront the challenge
of job creation, newly industrialized economies must contend with in-
frastructure problems, and developing nations must confront popula-
tion and poverty problems. Indeed, APEC comprises the United
States and Japan, the world's two wealthiest nations, but also China
52 Presumably Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the U.S. will be categorized as
developed countries who will have to achieve free trade by the earlier date of 2010. Id. at *1.
53 Andrew Pollack, Asia-Pacific Countries Near Agreement on Trade, NEw YoRK TimEs,
Nov. 15, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
54 APEC 'Economic Leaders' Declaration of Common Resolve'; Issued in Bogor, Indonesia
BNA DAILY REPORT FOR ExEcurnvFs, Nov. 16,1994, at *4, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Cumws File.
55 Thomas W. Lippman, Pacific Summit Agrees on Vast Free Market, WASH. Posr, Nov. 16,
1994, at Al.
56 Puffery in the Pacific, ECONOMIST, Nov. 11, 1989, at 15.
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and Indonesia, two of the world's poorest economies. 57 Illustrative of
such enormous diversity is the membership of Japan and Korea, the
countries with the most complex system of non-tariff barriers, New
Zealand, Hong Kong, and Singapore, three of the most "open" econo-
mies, and China and Taiwan, the two biggest economies which do not
partake in the GAIT. Though the APEC economies are starkly di-
verse, such diversity gives rise to complementarity, and interdepen-
dence provides the shared incentive for economic cooperation. Even
in view of such a shared interest toward increased trade and invest-
ment in the region, nations will ultimately follow their own national
interests. Such self-interest paves the way toward conflicting agendas.
Indeed, critics have commented that the most divisive issue
among APEC members is the existence of two very different ap-
proaches to the future development of APEC. While some nations
espouse the "Western" or "American" approach, others advocate
what has been termed the "Asian" or "ASEAN" approach.
To begin, the "Western" or "American" view adopts an institu-
tional approach which emphasizes legalistic structures, agreements,
and contracts, 59 and operates under fixed schedules and time frames.60
Were APEC to adopt such a path, the members would ratify charters,
treaties, and constitutions, negotiate agreements, sign contracts, and
develop a broad range of bureaucratized policy institutions and com-
mittees. Under such an approach, nations cede some of their national
sovereignty to supranational entities in an effort towards binding and
concrete multilateral decision-making. In accordance with the "West-
ern" approach, the European Union could potentially become a
model for APEC to emulate with its centralized decision-making
structures. Indeed, the "Western" approach would advocate an insti-
tutionalized Asia-Pacific Community or Asia-Pacific Free Trade Area.
In contrast to the "Western" approach, the "Asian" approach is
evolutionary, cautious and conservative, resting upon consensus build-
ing and peer pressure, and operating at a pace determined by the
slowest member.6' Under the "Asian" approach, there "are few
breakthroughs, no banner headlines." 62 While advocates of the
57 Seeking a Role for APEC, FIN. TiPAis, Sept. 2, 1994, at 15.
58 Lavin, supra note 4, at 50.
59 Datuk Dr. Noordin Sopiee, A 2020 Vision For APEC To Be 'The Most Free and Open,
Bus. TPAms (MALAYsiA), Sept. 1, 1994, at *1, available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File.
60 Yang Razali Kassim, APEC Forum Urged to Adopt ASEAN Approach, Bus. TIMES, June
21, 1994, at *1, available in LEXIS, World Library, Cumws File.
61 Id.
62 Sopiee, supra note 59.
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"Asian" approach admit that the process is painstakingly slow, they
point out that in attempting to aggregate the interests of countries of
such diversity, solely the "Asian" approach can foster confidence and
nurture reciprocity and voluntary concession-making.63 Its advocates
believe that in regard to any entity in its infancy, the "Asian" ap-
proach constitutes the only way that the organization can continue to
grow.64 As one Asian official responded, "[Westerners] now seem to
know that the way to do business with this part of the world is
[through] consensus-building and be[ing] a member of the team. The
days of the United States coming in to push their agenda are behind
US."
6 5
Though the two approaches appear to be diametrically opposed,
one Asian commentator, while conceding to some of the beneficial
aspects of the "Western" approach, lent much insight into the possibil-
ity of an amalgamation of the two views. He conceded:
Of course, in any international process, there must be a proper place for
arguments, for negotiations, for institutions and structures, for rules and
their strict enforcement, for the punishment of offenders and the reward
of those who behave well. But if the community of Asia Pacific econo-
mies.. .is to be constructed only [emphasis added] by using the [West-
ern] approach, we can be certain that APEC will not last for long. To
quote Shakespeare, there will be plenty of 'sound and fury, signifying
nothing.' 6
6
As there exists no central decision-making body in APEC to uni-
laterally mandate either an Asian approach or a Western approach, a
future task for APEC should be to work towards a compromise ap-
proach which, in the spirit of "Economic Cooperation," amalgamates
both approaches.
In observing the progress of APEC from the time of its creation
in 1989, one could note that a convergence has already begun. On the
one side, some of the ASEAN nations, notably Malaysia, have been
maintaining a hardline stance against further institutionalization, be-
lieving that such a process contravenes the three conditions the
ASEAN nations put forth before they agreed to join APEC: "no legal
binding power, no negotiating right, and no agreements that go fur-
ther than those reached under the GATT." 67 At the same time, how-
63 The APEC Family, supra note 15.
64 Sopiee, supra note 59.
65 Irene Ngoo, Days of US Pushing its Agenda on Asians Over, S-Ars TnwEs (SiNGAPoRE),
Sept. 3, 1994, at 4.
66 Sopiee, supra note 59.
67 Hiroshi Kashihar, APEC: Bold Vision, Bad Vibes: Free-Trade Proposal Causes Anxiety in
Southeast Asia, Nnucn WKLY, Nov. 1, 1993, at 19.
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ever, not every APEC member's position observes the strict Western
vs. Asian dichotomy. For instance, in 1993 a number of member econ-
omies were reported to have advocated APEC's eventual maturation
into a free trade area.68 Singapore, the United States, and Australia
seemed to be the strongest advocates, while Hong Kong, New Zea-
land, South Korea, and Canada were other supporters. 69 At the same
time, China, Japan, and Indonesia were not enthusiastic about the
idea, Malaysia was vehemently opposed, and Thailand was some-
where in between the two views.70
B. Bridging the Asian-Western Divide Through a "Flexible
Consensus"
Indeed, the most dramatic example of the beginnings of a conver-
gence of the two approaches is seen in the Bogor Declaration's com-
mitment to free trade and open markets by 2020, a commitment that is
stronger than that made by parties to the GATr.71 In uncharacteristic
APEC style, the APEC members adopted the Bogor Declaration on
the basis of a never-before-mentioned "flexible consensus," whereby a
minority of dissenters would not be able to obstruct the process of
APEC's adopting concrete commitments.72 As Australian Prime Min-
ister Paul Keating commented, "The fact that President Suharto, the
leader of one of the world's largest developing countries, has taken
the initiative is a sign of the fundamental transformations taking place
in the world economy."7
Thus, the APEC members at the Jakarta Summit were able to
temporarily bridge the divide between the Asian and Western dichot-
omy through "flexible consensus." As a result of this amalgamation
of the two approaches, the members were able to adopt an ambitious
program, in a manner upon which all could agree. On the one hand,
the members had embarked upon the goal of free trade and open
markets by the year 2020, a set objective and established timetable
that reflected a purely Western influence. At the same time, however,
68 Yang Razali Kassim, Fretting About ASEAN's Clout in a Bigger APEC, Bus. TIMEs, Nov.
18, 1993, at 19.
69 Id,
70 Id.
71 APEC Leaders Reach Agreement on Creation of Free Trade Zon4 supra note 8.
72 International Trade: APEC Leaders Reach Agreement on Creation of Free Trade Zone,
BNA DAILY REPORT FOR ExEcurrvw, Nov. 16,1994 at *4, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Curnws File.
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they had endeavored to accommodate the differing needs of the de-
veloping and developed members in a nonbinding effort to build con-
sensus, an approach that reflected a purely Asian influence as well.
Though the Bogor Declaration demonstrates the diverse members'
ability to overcome, for the time-being, the potential obstacles inher-
ent in the contrasting Asian and Western approaches, the extremely
ambitious Declaration leaves many questions unanswered and many
of the specific details to be resolved at a later date. As the year 2020
looms far ahead into the future, APEC must not stop at vague, non-
binding agreements but must rather build upon the "flexible consen-
sus" approach seen in Jakarta and undertake to identify specific,
immediate goals as well as goals for the interim period. As APEC's
Pacific Business Forum74 so persuasively argued in its "Business
Blueprint for APEC," APEC must still "prove its value by making
clear and substantive progress toward improving the business and eco-
nomic climate within APEC."75
In light of the members' professed intention to present and adopt
a blueprint that will stipulate the details on how to achieve trade liber-
alization in the region, APEC's members must once again assume the
"flexible consensus" approach, and this time specifically address goals
in priority areas. Because the private sector plays the most important
role in promoting free trade, APEC must concentrate on facilitating
business transactions in the region. One way is to provide for a dis-
pute settlement mechanism within the APEC regional framework.
In aspiring to liberalize trade in the region by 2020, APEC mem-
bers must address the need for a dispute resolution mechanism per-
taining exclusively to private business transactions in the Asia-Pacific
region. Indeed, the Pacific Business Forum confirmed the need for
APEC to address the area of dispute settlement mechanisms when it
discussed the recurrence of commercial disputes between businesses
in different member economies. Though the Report confirmed
APEC's commitment to use the GATT / World Trade Organization
(WTO) dispute settlement mechanism as the primary channel for
74 The Pacific Business Forum was created during the Seattle Summit wherein the APEC
Economic Leaders asked business leaders to form a Pacific Business Forum (PBF) to "identify
issues APEC should address to facilitate regional trade and investment and encourage the fur-
ther development of business networks throughout the region." Report of the Pacific Business
Forum, supra note 18, at i. In carrying forth its mission, the PBF set out to publish its "Vision"
and recommendations in its "Business Blueprint for APEC." In its Report, the PBF stressed the
need for a harmonization of policies and practices, and the establishment of region-wide stan-
dards as a necessary component to trade and investment liberalization. Report of the Pacific
Business Forum, supra note 18.
75 Report of the Pacific Business Forum, supra note 18, at 3.
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resolving disputes between governments, it noted that the legal frame-
work for dispute resolution of regional business transactions is en-
tirely unclear.76 As the Pacific Business Forum report so importantly
points out, "only pragmatic results which manifestly move APEC to-
wards a predictable trade and investment environment will encourage
the continued involvement in APEC by the business sector. ' 77 The
APEC-wide adoption of an international dispute resolution frame-
work designed for universal use would provide the clarity and uni-
formity necessary to promote increased trade and investment in the
region.
IV. APEC MEM1ERS SHOULD STRENGTHEN THE COMMrTMENT TO
OPEN REGIONALISM BY ADOPTING THE UNCITRAL
MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBrrRATION
A. Introduction
In striving to realize the goal of "open regionalism," APEC mem-
bers must once again overcome the Asian/Western dichotomy and
each member must agree to adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration to provide for an APEC-wide
dispute settlement mechanism that focuses exclusively on private busi-
ness transactions. In adopting the Model Law, the benefits to APEC
will be threefold. First, the APEC forum will show that it can bridge
the Asian/Western divide and work toward cooperative yet timely so-
lutions. Second, the uniform adoption of the Model Law by each
APEC member will promote a harmonization of the regional law of
international commercial arbitration and thereby facilitate regional
trade and investment. Third, by adopting the Model Law, APEC will
retain credibility by producing practical results within the APEC re-
gional framework, results which will contribute to the ultimate goal of
open regionalism by the year 2020.78
76 Report of the Pacific Business Forum, supra note 18, at 14. The PBF specifically noted
that due to the absence of region-wide dispute settlement mechanisms, disputes are very often
taken outside of the region for resolution purposes. The PBF made a general recommendation
in its Report that APEC Economic Leaders "agree to establish separate regional mechanisms
for the settlement through mediation, arbitration, etc of commercial disputes between businesses
in APEC economies, where the present procedures are unclear." Report of the Pacific Business
Forum, supra note 18.
77 Report of the Pacific Business Forum, supra note 18, at 3.
78 For further background on international commercial arbitration, see KLAus PETER BER.
oER, INTERNAToNAL ECONoMIc ARBITRAToN (1993).
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B. The Value of International Commercial Arbitration
Commercial arbitration 79 has been referred to as "an almost in-
dispensable precondition to achievement of the orderliness and pre-
dictability essential to any international business transaction. '80
Indeed, arbitration actually promotes the expansion of international
trade and improves international economic relations by decreasing the
risks involved with engaging in international commerce.81 When busi-
ness people are exposed to risk in an international business transac-
tion due to the absence of effective dispute resolution procedures,
they can undertake one of two responses. They can either 1) refrain
from engaging in the transaction or 2) assume the risk by increasing
the price of the transaction accordingly.' Whichever option they
choose, the free flow of trade is obstructed. In order to strengthen the
commitment to open regionalism, the APEC members must recognize
the correlation between the adoption of arbitration and the expansion
of foreign trade and investment.83 APEC member nations must en-
deavor to collectively instill confidence in business and promote re-
gional trade and investment by harmonizing the laws and procedures
governing private commercial dispute settlement.84
Of interest to APEC, international commercial arbitration offers
three distinct advantages in settling disputes arising in international
commercial transactions. First, arbitration offers an international fo-
rum where the parties are not restricted to national courts.8" Parties
may hesitate to sue in the country of another party, where the law and
procedures are unfamiliar and where the approach to legal issues may
be founded upon differing legal and cultural perspectives. Second, un-
like traditional court proceedings, arbitration proceedings are confi-
dential and private.86 Such an environment is particularly beneficial if
79 'Arbitration' is a device whereby the settlement of a question is entrusted to one or more
persons who derive their powers from a private agreement, not from the authority of a state, and
who are to proceed and decide the case on the basis of such an agreement. See Atrss;ANDRA
CASELLA, ARBrrRATON IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 6-7 (1992).
80 Kenneth T. Ungar, The Enforcement ofArbitral Awards Under UNCITRAL's Model Law
on International Commercial Arbitration, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 717 (1987).
81 HowAm, M. HOLTzmANN & JOSEPH E. NEumAUs, A GuIDE To THm UNCITRAL
MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBTrRATION 2-3 (1989).
82 Id at 3.
83 See CASELLA, supra note 79, at 6-7. Casella presents a general equilibrium model focused
on the relationship between the expansion of international trade and the adoption of arbitration.
84 HOLTZMANN & NEuHAus, supra note 81.
85 Clive M. Schmitthoff, Why Arbitration Is the Favored Method of Dispute Settlement, Fn'.
TImEs, Oct. 4, 1985, at *2, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
86 Robert Coulson, Resolving Disputes: The Arbitration Option, AM. LAW., Nov. 1991, at 45.
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the dispute is sensitive and information such as trade secrets, for ex-
ample, must be protected. Third, parties may select an arbitrator of
their own choice, a choice often made on the basis of the arbitrator's
expertise.87 Parties may select an arbitrator who has specialized
knowledge of trade practices or the parties may opt to choose a re-
tired judge, law professor, or attorney due to legal expertise.88 In the
realm of international business, corporations are resorting more and
more to arbitration for the resolution of disputes involving virtually
any commercial transaction from a joint venture, to a sales contract, to
a licensing agreement.
C. The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration8 9
Like APEC, the United Nations Commission on International
Trade law (UNCITRAL) seeks to encourage worldwide trade and in-
vestment. UNCITRAL was created in 1966 in order to rectify the
conflict among the international trade laws of different nations which
inhibited world trade.90 Today, UNCITRAL is known as the "core
legal body within the United Nations system.. .to further the progres-
sive harmonization and unification of the law of international
trade."9' Like APEC, UNCITRAL operates under the principles of
cooperation and consensus. 92 Unlike APEC, however, UNCITRAL's
membership transcends regional boundaries, joining nations from
around the globe 93and seeking solutions of universal acceptance.
Drafted in 1985, the Model Law on International Commercial Arbi-
tration [hereinafter Model Law] was designed to resolve difficulties
stemming from the diversity of domestic laws in their approach to the
law and procedure of international commercial arbitration. The
Model Law was designed for use in states with different legal, social,
and economic systems, in developed and developing countries alike,
87 HOLrZMANN & NEUHAUS, supra note 81, at 3.
88 Coulson, supra note 86.
89 Draft Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law, 40th Sess., Supp. no. 17 at 5, U.N. Doc. A/40/17 (1985) [hereinafter
Model Law].
90 John D. Franchini, International Arbitration Under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: A
Contractual Provision for Improvemen4 62 FoRDHAm L. REv. 2223,2224 (1994).
91 Id.
92 HoLTnzANN & NEuHAUS, supra note 81, at vi.
93 UNCITRAL's membership includes representatives from Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe,
Latin America, Western Europe and "others" which includes Australia, Canada, New Zealand,
and the United States. HOLTZMANN & NEuHAUS, supra note 81, at 4.
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and in every geographic location around the globe.94 The goals of the
Model Law are to promote party autonomy in the drafting and carry-
ing out of the arbitration agreement, to assure equality and fairness
among the parties, and to provide for the optimum amount of flexibil-
ity in devising an agreement to suit each party's needs.95
Well aware of the value of arbitration as a means of settling dis-
putes arising from international commercial transactions, UNCI-
TRAL set out to design a uniform arbitration procedure that
concentrated on three particular areas: 1)the powers of arbitrators,
2)the conduct of arbitrations, and 3)the scope of judicial supervision.96
The following part of the Comment will focus on the key provisions
which serve to unify the law of international commercial arbitration
and which would be of most interest to the members of APEC: the
scope of application, the arbitration agreement, the conduct of the ar-
bitral proceeding, the determination of award, and the recognition
and enforcement of awards.97 Together, these key provisions com-
prise the foundational rules upon which the members would rest their
APEC-wide framework. At the same time, these rules grant to pri-
vate parties the flexibility to tailor their arbitral agreement to the spe-
cific needs of the business transaction at hand.
D. The Scope of Application
The Model Law limits its scope to international commercial 98 ar-
bitration, whether the arbitration is ad hoc in nature or administered
by a permanent arbitral institution. Thus, the Model Law is not a
complete code, for once enacted by a nation it applies solely to inter-
94 HOLTZMANN & NEUHAUS, supra note 81, at 2.
95 Alyssa A. Grikscheit, International and Comparative Law: The UNCITRAL Framework
for Arbitration in Contemporary Perspective 92 MIcH. L. REv. 1989, 1991 (1989).
96 Robert Rice, Changes to Arbitration Law Urged, FIN. TnAEs, Sept. 21, 1989, at *1, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
97 For further information which describes, explains, and clarifies the UNCITRAL Model
Law, See ARON BROCHES, Coi M=AIY ON TmE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTMRNA-
TIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBrrRATION (1990); JACOMIJN J. vAN HOF, CoMMENTARY ON THE UN-
CITRAL ARBrrRATiON RuLEs: THE APPLiCATON BY THE IRAN-U.S. CLAims TRIBUNAL (1991).
98 The term "commercial" is interpreted broadly and encompasses matters 'arising from all
relationships of a commercial nature, whether contractual or not.' The definition covers, but is
not limited to, disputes relating to trade transactions, distribution agreements, factoring or leas-
ing transactions, engineering, licensing, consulting, construction of works, investment, financing,
banking, insurance, exploitation agreements or concessions, joint ventures and other forms of
industrial or business cooperation, carriage of goods or passengers, and other types of commer-
cial relationships. IsAx DoRE, THm UNCITRAL FRAMEwORK FOR ARBITRATION IN CONTEM-
PoRAY PERsPEcrvE 102 (1993).
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national and not domestic arbitrations. 99 The Law provides four alter-
native definitions of "international" which determines whether a
commercial arbitration is to be governed by the Model Law or a
State's domestic arbitration law. An arbitration is 'international' if: 1)
the parties have their places of business'00 in different countries at the
time of the conclusion of the arbitration agreement; 2) the place of
arbitration, if determined in, or pursuant to, the arbitration agree-
ment, is outside the country or countries in which the parties have
their places of business; 3) the place where a substantial part of the
obligations of the commercial relationship are to be performed is in
another country; 4) the place with which the subject matter of the dis-
pute is most closely connected is in a country other than the one in
which the parties have their places of business; or 5) the parties ex-
pressly agree that the subject matter of the arbitration relates to more
than one country.1 1 Thus, for example, if the members of APEC
each adopt the Model Law, and a Japanese corporation, with its sole
place of business in Japan, enters into a joint venture with a New Zea-
land corporation, whose sole place of business is in New Zealand, as
long as the parties either include an arbitration clause within their
contract or establish a separate arbitration agreement, any subsequent
arbitration between them would be considered 'international.'
Because arbitration cannot present an effective form of dispute
settlement if national courts heavily intervene in the arbitral process,
the Model Law provides that in matters governed by the Law, no
court shall intervene unless its provisions so allow.1 2 While the pur-
pose behind this provision is to clarify those areas where courts may
and may not intervene, the provision is confined solely to those mat-
ters regulated by the Model Law. Thus, possible areas of court inter-
vention, areas which the Model Law does not regulate, include: the
impact of state immunity, the competence of the arbitral tribunal to
adopt contracts, the period of time for enforcement of arbitral awards,
and the fixing of fees and deposits.10 3 By increasing clarity in the
99 Rice, supra note 96.
100 If a party has multiple places of business then the 'place of business' is defined as that with
the closest relationship to the arbitration agreement. If a party has no place of business then
reference is to be made to the party's 'habitual residence.' Model Law, supra note 89, art. 1(4).
101 Model Law, supra note 89, art. 1(3).
102 Model Law, supra note 89, art.5. Domestic courts are empowered to carry out certain
tasks in furtherance of international commercial arbitration, if the parties so agree under art. 6.
This would include the selection of a neutral arbitrator (art. 11(3)),compelling a recalcitrant
party to honor its arbitration commitments (art. 11(4)), and reviewing challenges to an arbitrator
for cause (art. 13(3)).
103 Don , supra note 98, at 104.
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realm of possible court intervention, this provision instills confidence
in business that disputes can be resolved efficiently and it advances
the cause of uniformity as well.
E. The Arbitration Agreement
Under the provisions of the Model Law, an arbitration agreement
is an agreement amongst parties where each has consented in writing
to submit all or certain disputes to arbitration that have arisen or may
arise in the future between them.1°4 The dispute must stem from a
defined legal relationship though it does not necessarily have to be
contractual. 05 The written requirement is met if the agreement is in-
cluded in an exchange of letters, telexes, telegrams, or other means of
telecommunication. Since the law most directly influences "the ease
with which business people and their lawyers are able to use arbitra-
tion as a system for resolving international commercial disputes," this
provision which defines the contents of an arbitration agreement is
one of the most essential parts of UNICTRAL's attempt to unify na-
tional arbitration statutes."° By ensuring that the procedural law of
international commercial arbitration is straightforward and transpar-
ent, the Model Law facilitates business in those countries that choose
to adopt it. Since one of APEC's primary goals is to expand trade and
investment in the Asia Pacific region, unilateral adoption of the UN-
CITRAL Model Law would prove a pragmatic step in helping the fo-
rum achieve its ambitious goals.
In distinguishing an arbitral tribunal from a court, the Model Law
defines the "arbitral tribunal" as a "sole arbitrator or a panel of arbi-
trators."'10 7 The arbitral tribunal has the competence to rule on its
own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence
or validity of the arbitration agreement, subject to judicial review.'08
Yielding much latitude in the realm of appointment of arbitrator(s),
the Model Law grants the parties the autonomy and flexibility to
agree on a procedure to appoint the arbitrators and to select the
number of arbitrators. If the parties provide that the arbitration be
administered by a permanent arbitral institution, they can refer the
arbitration to an established arbitral institution such as the Court of
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce or the
104 Model Law, supra note 89, art. 7(1).
105 Model Law, supra note 89, art. 7(1).
106 HOLTmmANN & NEuHAUS, supra note 81, at 258.
107 Model Law, supra note 89, art. 2(b).
108 Model Law, supra note 89, art.16(1).
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London International Arbitration Center. Should the parties select
ad hoc arbitration, they may agree on a sole arbitrator, but it is cus-
tomary business practice in major transactions to use a three-person
arbitration tribunal.1' 9 If the parties are unable to agree on a proce-
dure for selecting the arbitrators, the Model Law provides several de-
tailed provisions which formulate the composition of the tribunal." 0
An essential component in any dispute settlement mechanism,
the Model Law mandates the neutrality of the arbitrator and provides
procedures for challenge of arbitrators. An arbitrator has an affirma-
tive duty to disclose any justifiable doubts as to objectivity and may
be challenged if the circumstances demonstrate that there are justifi-
able doubts as to his/her impartiality or independence or if he/she
lacks the qualifications agreed upon by the parties."' Considering the
vast diversity among APEC's members in ethnic background, lan-
guage, religion, stage of economic development, and political system,
the requirement of independence and impartiality would be an essen-
tial prerequisite to a fair and equitable proceeding.
F. Conduct of the Arbitral Proceeding
In accordance with the aim of the Model Law to promote fairness
in the arbitral proceeding, the Law stipulates that the parties "shall be
treated with equality and each party shall be given a full opportunity
to present his case.""11 2 As the first subject for decision in an arbitra-
tion is the determination of rules of procedure, the Model Law re-
flects three fundamental policies to govern the decision: the policies
are (1) to ensure the autonomy of the parties in devising their own
rules of procedure; (2) to provide a flexible framework for "the tribu-
nal to operate under, in the absence of such agreement, so as to ac-
commodate a great variety of international cases without being unduly
restricted by the peculiarities of local laws"; and (3) to assure equality
and fairness [emphasis added]." 3 These policy priorities are aligned
109 Schmitthoff, supra note 85.
110 See Model Law, supra note 89, art. 11(3). The default rules are as follows: If the parties
choose to use a three-person arbitration tribunal, each party appoints one, and then the two
selected appoint the third arbitrator. Should either party fail to select an arbitrator within 30
days of receipt of request by the other party or should the two selected arbitrators fail to select a
third within 30 days of their having been appointed, the court or another agency designated by
each state in article 6 makes the appointment. Similarly, if the parties choose to use a single
arbitrator and the parties fail to agree on the individual appointed, the same court or agency
designated in article 6 will designate the arbitrator.
t111 Model Law, supra note 89, art.12(1) & (2).
112 Model Law, supra note 89, art.18.
113 DoRE, supra note 98, at 114.
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with APEC's concerns as well, for in granting parties "equal say,"
both entities seek to instill confidence and cooperation among the
participants who partake in the process.
Thus, under the Model Law, parties are granted a wide degree of
autonomy to agree upon the procedures to be followed in their arbi-
tration." 4 The parties have the option to tailor the procedure to suit
their specific needs or they may instead choose to incorporate a stan-
dard set of rules from an established arbitral institution.115 Failing
agreement, however, the arbitral tribunal is free to establish its own
procedures including evidentiary procedures and rules.116 In such an
instance, the tribunal is empowered to determine the admissibility,
relevance, materiality, and weight of the evidence presented.117 In-
deed, the drafters of the Model Law recognized that autonomy of
both parties and arbitrator(s) would prove critical to the creation of
an effective system of commercial arbitration in international pro-
ceedings where, due to the 'foreign' component, there exists an urgent
need to be free from unfamiliar local standards." 8
Continually reflecting the spirit of flexibility and party control,
the Model Law enables parties to determine both the site of the arbi-
tration 1 9 and the language to be used in the conduct of the proceed-
ings. 2 ° Just as with the determination of procedure, absent an
agreement by the parties, the arbitral tribunal has the ultimate author-
ity to decide. In determining the site of the arbitration, the tribunal
may factor in the convenience of the parties, the location of witnesses
and members of the tribunal, as well as location of the necessary docu-
ments and language used.' 2 ' Considering the wealth of languages
within the APEC forum, the determination of the language to be used
is of import to the cost, efficiency, and fairness of the proceeding.
G. Determination of Award
Once the parties have fulfilled the Model Law's requirement of
stating the facts supporting the claim, the points at issue, and the relief
sought, the tribunal decides the substance of the dispute in accordance
114 See Model Law, supra note 89, art.19(1).
115 DoRE, supra note 98, at 114.
116 Model Law, supra note 89, art. 19(2).
117 Model Law, supra note 89, art. 19(2).
118 HOLTZMANN & NEUHATJS, supra note 81, at 564.
119 Model Law, supra note 89, art.20(1).
120 Model Law, supra note 89, art.22(1).
121 Satumino E. Lucio, The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitra-
tion, 17 U. oF MLr.n INTER-AM. L. REv. 313, 315 (1986).
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with the rules of law chosen by the parties."2 Reflecting the constant
priority placed on party autonomy, the Model Law does not mandate
that the law chosen have a substantial connection to the dispute. 23 In
granting the parties such discretion, the Law imparts a "strong guaran-
tee of party autonomy on substantive matters, complementing the pro-
cedural autonomy guaranteed to the parties.[emphasis in original]."' 2 4
The parties can choose to invoke the laws of more than one legal sys-
tem as well as the rules of law of international conventions. In the
event that the parties are unable to agree upon the applicable substan-
tive law, the arbitral tribunal must apply the law determined by the
conflict of laws rules which it considers applicable. 125
Of great importance to business people, the arbitrator must place
due consideration upon the terms of the contract and any usages and
customs of international trade related to the transaction. 26 In terms
of decision-making, as long as there is more than one arbitrator on the
tribunal, the decision must be based upon majority decision.2 7 Fur-
thermore, the arbitral award must be in writing, and unless the parties
provide otherwise, it must stipulate the reasons upon which it is
based.128 Reasoned awards are crucial to any international commer-
cial proceeding for "it would be more difficult to enforce a one-line
award than a reasoned award, because the local court will want to
ensure that due process has been respected."' 9 As APEC's Pacific
Business Forum has professed concern about the commercial disputes
between businesses in different member economies, the implementa-
tion of harmonized legal rules that afford due process in the interna-
tional arena would grant security to parties contemplating long-term
business relations in the region.
122 Model Law, supra note 89, art. 28(1). The term "rules of law" refers to substantive law
rather than conflict of laws rules. In addition, the term includes the rules of law of one or more
legal systems and those of international conventions as well.
123 DoRE, supra note 98, at 119.
124 DoRE, supra note 98, at 119.
125 Model Law, supra note 89, arL28(2).
126 Model Law, supra note 89, art. 28(4).
127 Model Law, supra note 89, art. 29.
128 Model Law, supra note 89, art. 31(1) & (2).
129 Pierre Cournot, The New International Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration As-
sociation and the UNCITRAL Model Law: A Comparative Overview, 6 AUT Ih'L L. PRAcnr-
cum 20, 24 (1993).
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H. Recognition and Enforcement of Awards130
Seeking to unify the domestic treatment of all international arbi-
tration awards, the Model Law provides for uniform treatment of all
awards in the realm of enforcement. It states that all arbitral awards
are to be accorded recognition and, upon application, are to be en-
forced by the courts of states that have adopted the Model Law, irre-
spective of where the award was made. 31 In eliminating the
distinction between domestic and foreign awards, the Model Law took
a substantial step towards the harmonization of the legal regime of
international commercial arbitration. 3 z Were APEC members to
adopt the Model Law, in the instances where the Model Law super-
sedes domestic law, it would Strongly aid APEC in its aim to imple-
ment a regional framework for dispute resolution and further
facilitate business transactions by "requiring the same simple proce-
dural steps regardless of which country will enforce an award."'133
Similar to the provisions pertaining to the recognition and en-
forcement of awards, the provisions governing the challenge of an
award reflect the same policy that all awards rendered should be
treated equally. Recognition and enforcement will be refused only if
a party proves that 1) either party was under some 'incapacity'; 2) the
agreement is invalid under the applicable law; 3) there was lack of
notice of the proceedings or appointment of the arbitrator, and thus
130 The effort to seek the challenge and reversal of an award under Article 34 is quite difficult
because the Model Law strictly regulates access to courts for recourse against an award. While
the provisions in Article 34 (Application for Setting Aside as Exclusive Recourse Against
Arbitral Award) and Article 36 (Grounds for Refusing Recognition or Enforcement) appear
quite similar, the major difference between them is that Art. 34 is subject to a strict territorial
application while Article 36 applies irrespective of the country in which the award was made.
An award may only be set under Article 34 if- 1) either party was under an "incapacity"; 2) the
agreement was invalid; 3) a party was not given proper notice of the arbitrator's appointment or
was unable to present his case; 4) the award deals with a dispute outside outisde the scope of the
arbitration agreement or the submission to arbitration; 5) the tribunal was not composed in
accordance with the agreement; 6) the subject matter was not susceptible to resolution through
arbitration; 7) the award conflicted with public policy of the state adopting the law. Model Law,
supra note 89, art.34 2(a)&(b).
131 Model Law, supra note 89, art. 35(1). The rules for enforcing awards made in interna-
tional commercial arbitration were modelled on the procedural requirements of Article IV of
the New York Convention. However, whereas the New York Convention differentiates between
foreign and domestic awards, the Model Law treats all awards rendered in international com-
mercial arbitrations equally.
132 It is important to note that while the Model Law supercedes the domestic law of the
adopting country, thereby promoting uniformity, should conflict arise due to a treaty commit-
ment of the adopting state, the treaty commitment supercedes the Model Law. DoR., supra note
98, at 124.
133 Ungar, supra note 80, at 727.
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inability of a party to present his/her case; 4) the dispute was outside
the scope of the submission to arbitration; 5) the tribunal was not
properly composed or an improper arbitral procedure was applied; or
6) the award is not yet binding or has otherwise been set aside or
suspended by a court of the nation in which it was made. 34 The
Model Law comports with APEC's emphasis on consensus. In ensur-
ing that the decisions rest with the parties to determine which disputes
are to be submitted to arbitration, which laws are to be applied in the
arbitration, the composition of the tribunal, and the arbitral proce-
dures to be followed, the Model Law shares APEC's concern that the
process reflect a consensual approach.
V. COST/BENEFIT ANALYsIs OF APEC MEMBERS' ADOPTING THE
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW
A. Criticism of the UNCITRAL's Model Law
Many of the criticisms aimed at UNCITRAL's Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration are aimed at international arbi-
tration in general. First, international commercial arbitration can be
quite costly. Due to its international scope, international commercial
arbitration is accompanied by the expense of administration and arbi-
trator's fees, the need for added counsel, translators, interpreters, and
travel fees. 135 Second, international commercial arbitration can be
very lengthy. Delays are bound to occur due to the existence of a
foreign forum and the presence of foreign language(s). 136
At the same time, other criticisms are directed specifically at the
Model Law itself. First, some commentators criticize that the Model
Law's extremely flexible rules can be a source for delay tactics and
forum shopping by recalcitrant parties.137 For example, since effec-
tiveness of an ad hoc proceeding under the Model Law depends on
voluntary cooperation of the parties, a party could easily refuse to
play his/her part and delay the proceeding by raising questions of ju-
risdiction or procedure. Second, the rules have been criticized for fail-
ing to define certain crucial terms.138 The Model Law lacks provisions
governing such areas as: the definition of an arbitration; the definition
134 Model Law, supra note 89, art. 36.
135 Henry P. DeVries, International Commercial Arbitration: A Contractual Substitute for Na-
tional Courts, 57 Tui- L. REv. 42, 62 (1982).
136 Id
137 Grikscheit, supra note 95, at 1993.
138 U.K: Surveyor Report - A Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, CoN-
STRUMc'ON NEws, Oct. 6, 1989, *2, available in LEXIS, World Library, Cumws File.
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of 'full opportunity' in the phrase "full opportunity of presenting his/
her case"; the powers, duties, and liabilities of an arbitrator; and the
interpretation of arbitration agreements. 139 The absence of such defi-
nitional provisions is bound to raise many procedural issues in the im-
plementation of the Model Law. Third, the risk exists that there could
be substantial international differences in the application of the Model
Law provisions in different nations due to the great amount of free-
dom yielded to the parties in shaping their system of dispute resolu-
tion.140 Finally, some criticize the Model Law for not being a
complete code since it does not apply to domestic arbitration.
B. Benefits to APEC in Adopting the Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration
While the general criticisms directed at the cost and delay of in-
ternational commercial arbitration may prove valid in certain circum-
stances, nonetheless, from the perspective of many in the business
community, international commercial arbitration is the preferred
method for resolving disputes. First, when evaluated on the basis of a
cost/benefit analysis, many commercial entities view the arbitral tribu-
nal as "a neutral and cost-effective alternative to what they perceive
as biased, expensive, and time-consuming national courts."'' Second,
aside from the aforementioned benefits of privacy, arbitrator exper-
tise, and the attractive alternative of an international forum, partici-
pants in international trade have hailed international commercial
arbitration for its simplicity, informality, and for its often highly spe-
cialized judgments. Third, due to the presence of multilateral conven-
tions, bilateral treaties, and past court decisions all advocating the
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, it is often easier to enforce an
arbitral award as opposed to a judgment from a national court.142 Ac-
cording to a study by the Netherlands Arbitration Institute, more than
80% of private international business contracts have clauses providing
for dispute settlement by arbitration. 43 Legal scholars seem to con-
cur that "international arbitration is regarded by the business commu-
nity as the normal means of settling disputes arising from
international transactions."'144 Because of APEC's urgent need to find
practical ways of enmeshing the private business sector into the drive
139 Id.
140 Lucio, supra note 121, at 318.
141 Ungar, supra note 80, at 717.
142 HOLTMANN & NEUHAUS, supra note 81, at 3.
143 CASELLA, supra note 79, at 1.
144 CASELLA, supra note 79, at 1.
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toward open regionalism, APEC members must take heed of this gen-
eral business preference.
In analyzing the specific benefit to APEC in adopting the UNCI-
TRAL's Model Law, it is worthy to note that not only has one APEC
member, Canada, already adopted the Model law but three other
APEC members, Australia, Hong Kong, and New Zealand are among
those actively considering doing so. 145 Canada's adoption illustrates
that the Model Law can be applied to a federal system of govern-
ment.146 One APEC member with a federal system, the United
States, has failed to adopt the Model Law, although six American
states147 have recently patterned their arbitration legislation after the
Model Law. The adoption by Canada and the expression of interest
among some of the other members demonstrates that some APEC
members have already recognized the benefit of incorporating UNCI-
TRAL's Model Law into their national laws to promote their dynamic
economic growth.
In response to the criticism that the Model Law's flexibility will
lead to delay, the forces of a competitive business market will often
guard against intentional delay and the obstruction of business trans-
actions that results. While flexible rules may not be appropriate for
those who know they will never transact again, for those who transact
on a routine basis and who foresee a long-term business relationship,
mutual self-interest requires an amicable resolution of disputes' 48 and
advises against bad faith interruption of the arbitral process. This ob-
servation is supported by the fact that "when disputes arise, these par-
ties generally acquiesce in the decisions rendered by arbitral
145 U.K.: Surveyor Report - A Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, supra
note 138.
146 In the words of one scholar, "The decisive, rapid, and systematic implementation of the
UNCITRAL regime throughout Canada stands as a beacon to the U.S. and the rest of the world.
No doubt there are divergencies between the federal and provincial implementing regimes, as
well as among provincial statutory schemes. Yet these are outweighed by the overwhelming
consistency with which the federal and provincial jurisdictions have implemented the Model
Law.. ." DoRE, supra note 98, at 183.
147 Those states are Connecticut, California, Texas, Florida, Georgia, and Hawaii. DoRE,
supra note 98, at 129. Currently in the United States there exists a confusing three-tier regime
regulating international commercial arbitration as seen in federal law, state law, and modified
versions of the Model Law in the six states previously mentioned. As the federal government
retains plenary power in the regulation of commerce with foreign nations, the adoption of the
Model Law at the federal level would provide for uniformity within the federal system by resolv-
ing "the conflict and uncertainty between state and federal law as well as eliminat[ing] conflicts
among individual state laws." Id. at 132.
148 Ungar, supra note 80, at 717.
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tribunals.. .and losing parties voluntarily comply" with the award.149
Thus, for those private actors who are engaged in long-term business
transactions, a major area of interest for both UNCITRAL and APEC
members alike, the parties' business interest rests in furthering the
free flow of trade through cooperation rather than through intentional
delay. UNCITRAL's Model Law facilitates the free flow of trade in
its attempt to harmonize and unify the laws on international commer-
cial arbitration.
In order to facilitate the APEC-wide adoption of the UNCI-
TRAL Model Law, APEC members should take heed of the criticism
aimed at the Model Law for its failure to define certain terms. In
preparing for regional implementation, the members should establish
procedures for resolving differing interpretations of the Model Law
provisions. Working through a characteristic APEC consensual ap-
proach, the members should infuse their own Asia-Pacific conception
of certain terms and elaborate on those provisions which need further
clarification. To render adoption of the Model Law more palatable,
APEC members can include committee reports and a legislative his-
tory to ensure as much uniformity and common understanding as is
possible while still guaranteeing to private parties sufficient flexibility
to adapt the rules to their specific business needs.
In all, similar to APEC's consensual approach which accords re-
spect to differing economies and national interests, UNCITRAL's
Model Law itself represents a compromise approach between differ-
ent economies, legal systems, and principles. Its main attribute is that
"in those areas of arbitral procedure where the need for uniformity is
at its greatest and in the absence of which party expectations run a
high risk of being frustrated, the Model Law provide[s] the basic uni-
fying infrastructure."'150 The Model Law provides for greater clarity in
defining the role of national courts in the arbitral process, in defining
the process of appointing, challenging, and replacing arbitrators, in its
rules covering both choice of law regarding the arbitral procedure,
and choice of law covering the substance of the dispute, and in ex-
plaining how to resolve jurisdictional challenges to the tribunal it-
self.' 5' In harmonizing the law while simultaneously pursuing the
goals of autonomy, flexibility, fairness, and equality, the Model Law
represents a major contribution towards the promotion of arbitration
as a means of settling private international commercial disputes. Its
149 Ungar, supra note 80, at 717.
150 Dopm, supra note 98, at 127.
151 Dopm, supra note 98, at 127.
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unilateral adoption by each APEC member will prove a practical, pro-
gressive step towards the facilitation of international commerce.
VI. CONCLUSION
The members of APEC must guard against any tendency to re-
gress back into the Asian and Western dichotomies which can only
impede progress towards open regionalism in the year 2020. As mem-
bers of APEC's Pacific Business Forum advised, APEC must make
"practical progress towards a predictable trade and investment envi-
ronment in the Asia Pacific region."1 52 Instead of adopting extraordi-
narily ambitious goals one after the other, APEC members should
take the pragmatic step towards free trade by ensuring that each
member adopts the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Com-
mercial Arbitration. Canada has already done so. Australia, New
Zealand, and Hong Kong have acknowledged the Model Law's ap-
peal. Hopefully the recent arrival of a new 'flexible consensus' will
help curb skeptics' doubts as to APEC's credulity and galvanize sup-
port for a uniform Asia-Pacific law on international commercial
arbitration.
152 Report of the Pacific Business Forum, supra note 18, at ii.
